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J-19
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

EMERGENCY PLAN "T"

BREAK-OFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

6 SEPTEMBER 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TOP SECRET

J-19-C

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I INTRODUCTION	1
II PROBLEM	1
III SITUATION	1
IV PRECEPTS FOR PLANNING	1
V ASSUMPTIONS	2
VI CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED	2
VII DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM	3
VIII PREPARATIONS IN BEING FOR BREAKDOWN OF ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS	11
IX PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RECOMMENDED	12
X PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION	13
ANNEX (A) INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (SECRET)	
ANNEX (B) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)	
ANNEX (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)	
ANNEX (D) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)	
ANNEX (E) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)	
ANNEX (F) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)	
ANNEX (G) ADDITIONAL COURSES OF ACTION (TOP SECRET - NEED TO KNOW)	

TOP SECRET

J-19-6

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EMERGENCY PLAN

BREAKOFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

This plan endeavors to establish, for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations, courses of action for application in preparation for and in the event of a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

II

PROBLEM

To develop psychological courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.

III

SITUATION

1. Should the present Korean armistice talks fail, the danger of general war will be increased.
2. A period of alarm and spiritual depression will accompany the breakoff of negotiations and during this period the peoples of the world will be psychologically vulnerable.
3. It is imperative that we stand ready to wrest from Communism, during this period of psychological vulnerability, the initiative in psychological matters.

IV

PRECEPTS FOR PLANNING

1. On the principle that sound psychological operations are not independent operations but operations in support of political, economic, and military action,

TOP SECRET

J-19-6

and with the purpose of achieving U. S. initiative in the current psychological struggle with the Soviet Union, the following planning precepts are established:

- a. The policies, attitudes, and actions of the United Nations (as they reflect those of the United States) with respect to the initiation, conduct, and termination of the negotiations shall be put forcefully before the world;
- b. Communist propaganda and agitation with respect to the issues involved shall be vigorously undercut;
- c. Psychological planning shall be directed toward the end of achieving marked intensification of anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world;
- d. Psychological action shall be thoroughly integrated with United Nations political, economic, and military policy (as it reflects United States political, economic, and military policy).

V

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That the United States continues to act within the framework of UN authorization and seeks constantly to maintain and strengthen UN support for U. S. political, economic, and military policies and actions following breakdown of negotiations.
2. That, as sequel to breakdown of negotiations, military operations in Korea, entering into a new phase, may take on greater scope.

VI

CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED

1. In approaching the problem, three possible contingencies must be considered:

CONTINGENCY I

- a. There is a definitive end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground, air or naval forces.

TOP SECRET

J-1948

CONTINGENCY II

- a. There is a definite end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;
- c. The enemy does not initiate massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground or naval forces and his counteraction to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong to interfere seriously with the effectiveness of UN operations.

CONTINGENCY III

- a. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility existing for renewal at any time;
- b. Communists do not launch massive air attacks or submarine action;
- c. No evidence of increased major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words, enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto ceasefire without agreement.)

2. Possible modifications of the above contingencies are foreseeable, but proper planning for the listed contingencies will encompass those modifications should they arise.

VII

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMA. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Essential to the task of U. S. psychological operations is the seizure from the Kremlin of the psychological initiative. To accomplish such seizure we must not only anticipate events having psychological import but must also have a properly formulated psychological attack underway prior to the event.

2. Our hold on the initiative once gained must then be constantly strengthened by the manner in which it is exploited. The psychological attack must have well-defined objectives, must be of sufficient scope to embrace all foreseeable occurrences, and must be so designed as to allow ample room for maneuver under any expected circumstance or set of circumstances.

TOP SECRET

J-19-2

3. The psychological attack not only must outguess all possible courses of action by the enemy, in order that these courses of action can be immediately countered, but also must create situations which will allow the enemy no choice but to move into psychologically disadvantageous positions.

4. In addition, in the case of the Korean armistice negotiations the psychological attack must be governed by certain special considerations. Constantly it must be borne in mind that any action taken prior to an actual breakdown must not jeopardize, and preferably should enhance, the possibility of achieving our real, immediate objectives, which, in the case of Korean armistice negotiations, are specifically:


- (1) To further the early and favorable completion of the negotiations;
- (2) To ensure that the United Nations and the United States are credited before the world for the successes obtained at the negotiations, and that the Soviet Union is blamed for all delays, obstacles, and failures.

5. In addition, any psychological action relevant to anticipated breakdown of armistice negotiations should be such as to assist in the principal U. S. international objective of building the moral, economic, and military strength of the free world and the attaining and holding of political unity among the nations not now under the domination of Soviet Communism.

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B. INITIATING THE ATTACK AND SETTING ITS SCOPE

TOP SECRET

2. Looking beyond the possibility of an armistice agreement at Kaesong to political negotiations regarding Korea, we see in this specific case the advantages that might accrue from greater room for maneuver in such political negotiations. Using graphical exposition this point might be explained as follows:



* Within the purview of this plan the word "intensity" in its relation to propaganda shall be taken to mean: (a) percentage of output devoted to Korean events and issues; and (b) degree to which all U. S. propaganda is focused upon the Korean situation, principally by cross-relation of Korean lines with other output.

TOP SECRET

J-19-X

3. By maintaining, with forethought, the intensity of our psychological attack at the level it reaches at the Treaty Conference until Korean negotiations enter a political phase, rather than allowing it to drop back to pre-Conference level, we would achieve several advantages:

- (1) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of free world distrust of Soviet-led Communism.
- (2) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of rearmament efforts in the U. S. and the free world.
- (3) We would have greater scope for maneuver, and the effect should be more marked, should conditions surrounding the Korean political negotiations dictate a slackening of our propaganda intensity;

But most important

- (4) Our psychological attack would not only be aiming at a possible target, the Korean political negotiations, but also would be aiming at the actual immediate target of this problem — the Korean armistice negotiations.

4. It is apparent from the graph above that termination of the Korean armistice talks, whether successful or unsuccessful, will fall somewhere between the Japan Peace Treaty Conference and Korean political negotiations. It is natural that a high level of psychological intensity would and should accompany unsuccessful breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations. In the event that an armistice actually occurs our problem merely shifts from negotiations in the purely military field to negotiations in the political field.

5. Thus a high intensity psychological attack initiated concurrently with the Japan Peace Treaty Conference would serve our purpose for the Korean armistice negotiations as well as for possible Korean political negotiations. Speaking in terms of the psychological attack, we would be moving in on events rather than being in the position of having been caught short by events — no matter what the outcome of the present Kaesong talks.

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TOP SECRET

J-19-6

5. Should the third situation arrive, nothing would have been lost and much gained. Charges against Soviet-led Communism of insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent would merely be shifted to the political negotiations which would follow the armistice. The special UN (U. S.) objective of achieving a Korean armistice would have been obtained. Success in the armistice negotiations would be attributed to UN confidence and determination and to the growing, and already considerable, moral, economic, and military strength of the free world. The fact of armistice could be taken as proof of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the U. S. psychological attack, and warnings of the Soviet double-cross to come in the political negotiations would prevent relaxation in the anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world.

E. SEIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVE

Our first and principal objective, then, and the psychological courses of action supporting that objective, as extracted from the above discussion, can be summarized as follows:

To seize from Soviet-led Communism the psychological initiative.

COURSES OF ACTION UNDER THE OBJECTIVE

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TOP SECRET

- (9) Additional measures to assure security of Southeast Asia:
- (a) Public warning regarding further Communist adventures similar to that in Korea.
 - (b) Discussions with all nations of Southeast Asia, including India.

11A

02451

TOP SECRET

J-19-C

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RECOMMENDED

The following psychological courses of action pertinent to a breakdown in Korean armistice negotiations are recommended:

COURSE OF ACTION I


Departments, agencies, and officials presently charged with planning for and execution of actions listed in Section VIII of this plan continue planning for these actions, and execute approved plans in the event of breakdown of armistice negotiations.

COURSE OF ACTION II

Department of State, supported by other departments and agencies engaging in propaganda activities, develop and promulgate propaganda policy guidance in accordance with Section VII and ANNEXES (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) of this plan.

COURSE OF ACTION III

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ADDITIONAL COURSES OF ACTION

Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, supported by other departments and agencies as necessary, carry out planning, preparation, execution and development recommended in ANNEX (G).

TOP SECRET

J-19-c

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PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION

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a. Planning and execution under Basic Plan [REDACTED] will be as indicated in assigned courses of action. 25X1C
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b. The department or agency having primary planning and execution responsibility for portions of this plan will coordinate planning and execution with departments and agencies which are assigned or accept supporting responsibilities.

c. In instances in which necessary concurrences between departments and agencies are not forthcoming, planning and execution problems will be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for necessary coordination or procurement of higher level decision. 25X1A2G

d. Departments and agencies to whom Plan [REDACTED] assigns planning and execution responsibilities will submit special reports, as requested, to the Psychological Strategy Board.

Attention

e. Special Contingency Guidance of 26 July 1951, ARMISTICE BREAKDOWN, prepared by the Foreign Information Policy Staff, Department of State, will apply in the event a breakoff of negotiations occurs prior to completion of special plans developed under these objectives. 25X1A2G

f. Special Contingency Guidance of 27 July 1951, OPERATION [REDACTED] prepared by the Foreign Information Policy Staff, Department of State, will apply in similar circumstances, if the UN Command is compelled by a Communist air offensive to launch air attacks on Chinese and Manchurian bases.

TOP SECRET

02451